top of page

Viramontes v. Cook County and Undead Originalism

1 day ago
6 min read

Date Written: 5/10/2026

SEO terms: Supreme Court, individual rights, second amendments, originalism

This article discusses firearm-related deaths and mass casualty events


Second Amendment Rally Against Gun Control’. Photograph by Fibonacci Blue, via Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC BY 2.0.
Second Amendment Rally Against Gun Control’. Photograph by Fibonacci Blue, via Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC BY 2.0.

The new US Supreme Court term has largely flown under the radar in US news, which is currently dominated by legal issues surrounding President Trump and speculation around the upcoming midterm elections. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) began its Fall term on 5 October 2026, with several cases slated to test the ideology of the current court, often described as a ‘conservative supermajority.’ This includes several cases that invoked the US Bill of Rights, including two consolidated cases–Viramontes v Cook County and Grant v Higgins–that ask SCOTUS to overturn automatic weapons bans based on the second amendment to the Constitution, which reads:


A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.


More than a question of public safety or individual liberty, the case will be a reflection of the Justices’s continued experimentation with constitutional originalism. 


Constitutional originalists view the American constitution as ‘dead’ or ‘frozen,’ meaning that all jurisprudence should flow from the original definitions, meanings, and actions of the time when the constitutional provision was enacted; in the case of the second amendment, that means 1791. While Supreme Court Justices have always considered historical precedent related to the constitutional question at hand, the modern iteration of originalism was born in the latter half of the 20th century. Still, originalism was not popular. It was not until 1974 when Justice Antonin Scalia was confirmed and began advocating for originalism from the nation’s highest court. At a symposium in 2005, Scalia lamented that ‘I am one of a small number of judges, small number of anybody — judges, professors, lawyers — who are known as originalists.’ 


Today, four of the six Republican-nominated Justices are self-described originalists and Brett Kavanaugh, nominated by Donald Trump in 2018, frequently parrots Scalia’s ‘history and tradition’ methodology. But originalism didn’t just grow more popular in the intervening decades; it changed significantly, including in the realm of second amendment jurisprudence. 


In 2010, Scalia authored the majority opinion in District of Columbia v Heller, a case that struck down D.C’s strict handgun ban; this case reflects the state of originalism at the time, including its major gaps in reasoning. Heller held that firearms ‘in common use [...] for lawful purposes’ are protected by the second amendment, and that the popularity of handguns meant the law should be struck down. The ruling reflects Scalia’s preference for ‘original public meaning’ as well as textual and the intentions of the constitution’s Framers. 


But Scalia’s originalist reasoning falls flat with regard to gun safety: the public did not widely consider the issue in 1791. A study of the Corpus of Founding Era American English, created five years after Heller, concluded that the original public meaning of the right to bear arms was ‘much closer call’ and contained much more nuance than Scalia’s opinion concluded. This highlights another problem with originalism and textualism: scholars do not publish for the Supreme Court’s calendar. It also demonstrates an inevitable cherry-picking when originalists attempt to create a factual, rather than rational, truth. Orin Kerr, a preeminent constitutional scholar and fellow conservative, points out that Scalia often dismissed more unsavory aspects of following the popular sentiment of the 18th century, such as the exclusion of women, enslaved people, and indigenous people from many constitutional protections. 


Scalia, however, still engaged somewhat in the methodology preferred by non-originalists as he considered the balance between individual liberty and government interest. His majority opinion allows for prohibiting firearms in certain public spaces despite a lack of historical or textual evidence. As such, Heller allowed many firearm restrictions to stand. 


Despite Scalia’s frequent evocation of ‘culture wars,’ vocal abhorrence of homosexuality, and brazen insistence that public hangings, in the style of 1790s executions, are legal and constitutional, his originalist perspective is more moderate than that of current SCOTUS Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito. When asked about the difference between himself and Justice Thomas, Scalia said, ‘I am an originalist. I am not a nut.’ In 2012, Scalia chastised Alito for taking his originalism too far in United States v. Jones and suggesting modern surveillance technology must be analogised to 18th-century policemen. 


Justice Scalia passed away in 2016, but originalism has only grown more ubiquitous at the Supreme Court. Justices Thomas and Alito, who practice a more ‘extreme’ version of originalism, have gone from being a vocal minority dissenting to the writers of many majority opinions on the court. Additionally, Reuters reported that ‘Thomas and Alito backed every major Trump administration policy [...] unlike the three conservative justices Trump appointed during his first term — Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett’ and NPR noted that Thomas is more willing to undo precedent than Scalia ever was. 


Thomas’s version of originalism and the second amendment, is on display in his majority opinion in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, decided in 2022. In Thomas’s opinion, lower courts are directed to evaluate gun regulations exclusively by historical analogy; he writes: ‘To justify its regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.’ This was a rupture from the slowly-establishing precedent after Heller, after which several federal courts adopted a methodology for evaluating firearms legislations that included textual analysis, traditional meanings, and the interests of the governing body in regulating firearms. Thomas declared this to be ‘one step too many and removes the balancing of government interest from the equation. 


The majority, much as in Heller, does not consider all historical context. Thomas ignores the context of the 14th amendment and Reconstruction gun regulation, hand-waving laws in Texas, Georgia, and others as ‘outliers’. But more significantly for firearm legislation, the decision in Bruen left federal and state courts scrambling without a clear precedent for evaluation or a tiered scrutiny system like many constitutional rules. The lack of on-demand research that constrained Heller remains in the wake of Bruen. District Judge Irene Berger lamented the decision in 2022, writing in United States v Holden that the Bruen decision ‘requires original historical research into somewhat obscure statutory and common law authority from the eighteenth century by attorneys with no background or expertise in such research.’ The cherry-picking present in Heller also remains, as other judges find that historical facts are always placed within a biased narrative. 


Complete reliance on originalism has thrown second amendment jurisprudence into disarray. Joseph Blocher and Eric Ruben found that, “In the year after Bruen, courts reached divergent results regarding the constitutionality of laws banning people under felony indictment from acquiring new guns; prohibiting assault weapons, firearms with obliterated serial numbers [...] banning gun possession by people convicted of nonviolent felonies; barring guns in “sensitive places” such as places of worship, summer camps, urban mass transit, and Times Square…”


In one such example from 2024, Rahimi v United States, SCOTUS chastised the Fifth Circuit for overturning a law that prevents people with a restraining order obtained by an intimate partner from possessing a firearm; Chief Justice Roberts accused the Fifth Circuit of looking for a ‘historical twin to justify the law, rather than allowing a ‘historical principle’ of disallowing possession for dangerous persons to fulfil the historical analogy requirement laid out in Bruen. Roberts did not, however, specifically outline what methodology he would find acceptable in the wake of Bruen’s originalism mandate.  


SCOTUS may have a chance to decide what they want from lower courts once and for all with Viramontes, and the issue of firearm safety has only become more prominent since Heller or Bruen. Firearm related deaths have increased significantly since 2012: firearm-related suicide rates increased 20.1%, while firearm-related homicide increased 62.5%. Likewise, mass shootings have become far more common in the United States over the past two decades, with the number of mass shooting incidents rising from less than 400 per year in 2015-18 to more than 600 per year between 2020-23. In fact, the law in question in Grant v. Higgins was passed in response to the mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School. 


How the court will respond remains in doubt. It seems likely that the majority in Viramontes will include both plain-text and historical analogy interpretation, both of which are hallmarks of constitutional originalism in the 21st century. Petitioners in both cases have invoked Heller and Bruen originalist debate, but notably, the governments serving as defendants also argue in line with the originalist paradigm. 


Originalism has become so popular on the conservative supermajority’s Supreme Court that it now seems that debates about constitutional rights are not fought between originalists and a consequence-based interpretation, nor an ‘active liberty’ perspective like that outlined by former Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer. Instead, Justices, plaintiffs, and defendants alike duke it out to have their version of history read as correct, either morally or factually. As Elena Kagan famously quipped in her 2010 confirmation hearing, ‘We apply what [the Founders] say, what they mean to do. In some way, we are all originalists now.’ She invoked originalism closer in line with Scalia’s interpretation; perhaps an interpretation that will never return. 




 
 
bottom of page